Department of Philosophy
Département de Philosophie
University of Geneva
Université de Genève
- (2010) Qu'est-ce que la connaissance? Paris, Vrin. (on Amazon.)
- (2009, submitted) “Connaissance et enjeux pratiques”, Revue étudiante de philosophie analytique, 1, 13-19.
- Overview of the pragmatic encroachment debate.
- (2008, invited) “Pourquoi le problème de Gettier est-il si important ?”, P. Ducray (éd), Revue Klesis, 9:2008, 64-104.
- Argues against the common idea that the "justified-true-belief" analysis of knowledge was the traditional one, provides an alternative view of the history of epistemology, and an hypothesis about why Gettier problems were discovered only in the XXth century.
- Prix Humbert de philosophie, Geneva 2009.
- (2007, submitted) “Inexact Knowledge, Margin-for-Error and Positive Introspection”, in Dov Samet (ed.) Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XI), Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007, pp.118-124.
- Williamson (2000a) has argued that positive introspection is incompatible with inexact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety principle for knowledge, but leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and positive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety requirement while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge that underlies the new requirement provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s.
- (2007, invited) “The Case for Infallibilism”, in C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy (LMAP/07), Department of Philosophy, University of Genoa, Genoa, 2007, pp. 59-84.
- Distinguishes three notions of infallibilism (closure, evidential infallibilism, modal infallibilism), and argues that a modal infallibilist condition is required to avoid Gettier problems and explain lotteries, and that such a condition does not need to lead to scepticism.
- (2005, submitted) Justo D., Dutant J., Hardy-Vallée B., Nicolas D. et Sylvand B. (2003), “Delegation, Subdivision,and Modularity”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26: 683-684.
- with Pascal Engel, Philosophie de la connaissance, Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Collection of classic epistemology papers: Moore, Gettier, Chisholm, Lehrer, Sosa, Nozick, Goldman, Lewis, Williamson, ...
Last update: 02 Oct 2010 15:58:23.
Dernière mise à jour: 02 Oct 2010 15:58:23.
© 2006-2013 Julien Dutant unless otherwise indicated.
© 2006-2013 Julien Dutant sauf mention contraire.