Book

Papers

(2009, submitted) “Connaissance et enjeux pratiques”, Revue étudiante de philosophie analytique, 1, 13-19.

(2008, invited) “Pourquoi le problème de Gettier est-il si important ?”, P. Ducray (éd), Revue Klesis, 9:2008, 64-104.

Argues against the common idea that the "justified-true-belief" analysis of knowledge was the traditional one, provides an alternative view of the history of epistemology, and an hypothesis about why Gettier problems were discovered only in the XXth century.
Prix Humbert de philosophie, Geneva 2009.

(2007, submitted) “Inexact Knowledge, Margin-for-Error and Positive Introspection”, in Dov Samet (ed.) Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XI), Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007, pp.118-124.

Williamson (2000a) has argued that positive introspection is incompatible with inexact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety principle for knowledge, but leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and positive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety requirement while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge that underlies the new requirement provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s.

(2007, invited) “The Case for Infallibilism”, in C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy (LMAP/07), Department of Philosophy, University of Genoa, Genoa, 2007, pp. 59-84.

Distinguishes three notions of infallibilism (closure, evidential infallibilism, modal infallibilism), and argues that a modal infallibilist condition is required to avoid Gettier problems and explain lotteries, and that such a condition does not need to lead to scepticism.

(2005, submitted) Justo D., Dutant J., Hardy-Vallée B., Nicolas D. et Sylvand B. (2003), “Delegation, Subdivision,and Modularity”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26: 683-684.

Collection of classic epistemology papers: Moore, Gettier, Chisholm, Lehrer, Sosa, Nozick, Goldman, Lewis, Williamson, ...